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Forensic Science: Hair Comparison Evidence 
Paul C. Giannelli* and 
Emmie West** 
Introduction 
Hair evidence may be invaluable in some criminal prosecutions, 1 but it 
is often abused. The publication of a 1996 Department of Justice report 
discussing the exoneration of twenty-eight convicts through the use of DNA 
technology highlights this point.2 Some of these convicts had been sentenced 
to death. In several of these prosecutions, hair analysis was used to obtain 
the conviction. 
Edward Honaker 
In this case, the expert testified that the crime scene hair sample ''was 
unlikely to match anyone" other than the defendant, Edward Honaker.3 A 
prosecutor would later acknowledge that "[t]here was no question that the 
state hair expert [at Honaker's trial] had overstated the distinctiveness of the 
hair recovered from the victim's shorts in his trial testimony. " 4 This com-
* Albeti J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case 
Western Reserve University. This column is based in part on P. Giannelli & E. Im-
winkelried, Scientific Evidence (3d ed. 1999). Reprinted with permission. 
** Class of 2002, Case Western Reserve University. 
1 Genera1ly, after making the determination that a sample is a hair and not a fiber, 
an analyst can determine: (1) whether the hair is of human or animal origin, (2) the 
sex of the person who was the source of the hair, (3) the race of the person who was 
the source of the hair, (4) the part of the body that the hair came from, (5) whether 
the hair has been dyed, (6) whether the hair was pulled or fell out due to natural 
causes or disease, (7) the presence of poisons or drugs, (8) whether the hair was cut 
or crushed, and (9) the ABO blood grouping of the hair source. See 2 P. Giannelli & 
E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence§ 24-2 (3d ed. 1999); Imwinkelried, "Forensic 
Hair Analysis: The Case Against the Underemployment of Scientific Evidence," 39 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 41 (1982). 
2 E. Connors, T. Lundregan, N. Miller & T. McEwen, Convicted by Juries, 
Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish In-
nocence After Trial (1996)[hereinafter "Exonerated by Science"]. 
3 Id. at 58. 
4 H. Levy, And the Blood Cried Out: A Prosecutor's Spellbinding Account of the 
PowerofDNA 153 (1996). 
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ment is a gross understatement. At best, the expert could have testified that 
the hairs were "consistent," which means that they could have come from 
Honaker or thousands of other people. A competent expert should have 
known this. A competent prosecutor should have also known this. Honaker 
spent ten years in prison. DNA proved him innocent. Indeed, another hair 
examiner would later opine that ''the hairs were not comparable.' ' 5 
There were other problems in the use of scientific evidence in this case. 
First, the fact that the prosecution witnesses had been hypnotized prior to 
trial was not revealed until the post trial proceedings. 6 This is a patent 
constitutional violation. 7 Second, "Honaker had a vasectomy in 1977, but 
the vaginal swab recovered intact sperm, inconsistent with Honaker's asper-
mic state. " 8 The defense did not pursue this issue. This case represents all 
that is so troublesome in criminal litigation-bad lawyering (on both sides) 
combined with bad expert testimony. 
Roger Coleman 
Roger Coleman was executed in 1992 for a 1981 slaying in rural Vir-
ginia. The same expert who had testified against Honaker also testified 
against Coleman.9 The United States Supreme Court mled that a lawyer's 
mistake in filing Coleman's state collateral appeal (one day late) precluded 
5 J. Tucker, May God Have Mercy: A True Stmy of Crime and Punishment 345 
(1997) ("With the cooperation of a conscientious prosecutor, Kate Germond had 
the hairs reexamined by one of the world's leading experts on hair analysis and 
DNA tests perfonned on spenn found on a vaginal swab taken from the victim at the 
time of the rape. The hair expert said that in his opinion the hairs were not compara-
ble, and the DNA analysis proved beyond doubt that Honaker was not the rapist.''). 
6 Levy, supra note 4, at 153. 
7 E.g., Orndorff v. Locld1art, 998 F.2d 1426, 1436, 39 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 283 
(8th Cir. 1993), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied, (913513)(Aug. 3, 1994) (prosecu-
tion's failure to notify the defense that a witness had been hypnotized constituted a 
confrontation violation because it deprived the accused of the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness on this issue), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1060 (1994); U.S. v. 
Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 827 (2d Cir. 1969) (new trial granted because the prosecution 
failed to inform the defense that a key witness had undergone hypnosis); Brown v. 
State, 426 So. 2d 76, 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. lst Dist. 1983) (disapproved of by, 
Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985)) ("[D]ue process demands that counsel be 
afforded a fairer means by which to prepare his defense to this critical evidence.''); 
State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386, 395 (1983); Gee v. State, 
662 P.2d 103, 105 (Wyo. 1983). 
8 Levy, supra note 4, at 153. There were other problems. See also id. ("The rapist 
spoke obsessively about Vietnam; Honaker had never been there. Both the victim 
and her fiance were sure that the rapist held the gun in his left hand, and Honaker 
was right-handed."). 
9 See Tucker, supra note 5, at 345 ("In October 1994, after nearly ten years in 
prison, Edward Honaker was released. The state forensic expert who had testified in 
1985 that the hairs were comparable and unlikely to have come from anyone other 
than Honaker was Elmer Gist.'') 
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federal habeas review.10 Serious questions about Coleman's innocence have 
been raised, and the prosecution's use of hair evidence was problematic, at 
the very least. 11 In his book on the Coleman case, John Tucker interviewed 
the trial judge who underscored the crucial nature of the hair evidence: 
"Years later, in response to the author's question about what evidence in the 
case he thought had the most powerful impact on the jury, Judge Persin said 
it was Elmer Gist's testimony about the comparison of the pubic hairs. It 
was, Judge Persin observed, the first and only testimony that seemed to tie 
Roger Coleman to the murder specifically. ''12 As Tucker correctly notes: ''A 
finding of consistency is highly subjective, and experts may and often do 
disagree about such a finding. " 13 Nevertheless, at trial the prosecutor 
''described, with great emphasis, the scientific evidence, and especially the 
comparison of the pubic hairs, asserting that 'it would be extremely unlikely 
that anyone else would have hair that would be consistent with this hair.'' ' 14 
Unfortunately for Coleman, the defense counsel failed to challenge this state-
ment.15 Tucker describes the testimony as follows: Nor did [the expert] 
compare the pubic hairs found on Wanda [the victim] with anyone other 
than Coleman and Wanda herself-not even her husband Brad. Neverthe-
less, when he asserted that he had made a comparison of those hairs with 
Roger's pubic hair, and that the hairs were "consistent" with each other, 
meaning, he said, that is was ''possible, but unlikely'' that the hairs found 
on Wanda could have come from anyone other than Roger Coleman, the 
jurors exchanged glances and settled back in their seats.16 
10 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 
(1991). 
11 See Tucker, supra note 5; Taylor, "Was An Innocent Man Executed?," Amer-
ican Lawyer 40, 40-41 (Dec. 1997))('Td put the odds that Coleman was innocent 
somewhere above fifty-fifty." "The state's hair evidence was shown (after the trial) 
to be far from probative and far from reliable."). See also Tabak, "Death Penalty 
Be Not Proud," 84 A.B.A. J. 80, 80 (Jan. 1998)("[D]efense counsel did not seri-
ously challenge a highly dubious hair comparison that greatly influenced the jury. 
The lawyer who dealt with the evidence had never examined a hair expert befor-
e.' ')(reviewing Tucker's book). 
12 Tucker, supra note 5, at 7 5 ("According to Gist, he had microscopically 
compared the pubic hair found on Wanda McCoy with those removed from Roger 
Coleman on March 13, and they were 'consistent.'"); id. at 51 ("Unlike fingerprints, 
hairs are not positive identifiers, and unlike blood types, there is no scientifically ac-
cepted figure for the number or percentage of people whose hair is 'consistent' with 
one another. ... But as Jack Davidson and Mickey McGlothlin !mew, or would 
soon find out, Elmer Gist had often testified, and would surely testify again, that it is 
'possible, but unlikely' that consistent hairs could come from different people.''). 
13 Id. at 51. 
14 Id. at 63. 
15 Id. at 64 ("The scientific evidence was ignored altogether, leaving unchal-
lenged McGlothlin's exaggerated claim about the importance of the public hairs."). 
16 Id. at 76. 
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Ron Williamson 
The use of hair evidence in convicting the ilmocent is also discussed in 
Scheck, Neufeld and Dwyer's Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution 
and Other Dispatches from the Wrongly Convicted. 17 They include a chapter 
on Williamson v. Reynolds/8 a federal habeas corpus case. There, an expert 
testified at trial that hair samples were "consistent microscopically."19 The 
expert then went on to explain what this meant: ''In other words, hairs are 
not an absolute identification, but they either came from this individual or 
there is-could be another individual somewhere in the world that would 
have the same characteristics to their hair.' ' 20 However, the federal district 
court noted that the "expert did not explain which of the 'approximately' 
twenty-five characteristics were consistent, any standards for determining 
whether the samples were consistent, how many persons could be expected 
to share this same combination of characteristics, or how he arrived at his 
conclusions. " 21 Moreover, the district court professed that it had "been 
unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any indication that expert hair 
comparison testimony meets any of the requirements' '22 of Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,23 the Supreme Court case setting forth a 
reliability test for the admissibility of scientific evidence. The district court 
observed: ''Although the hair expert may have followed procedures accepted 
in the commmlity of hair experts, the human hair comparison results in this 
case were, nonetheless, scientifically unreliable. " 24 Finally, as is often the 
case, the prosecutor exacerbated the problem by stating in closil1g argm11ent, 
"There's a match. " 25 Even the state court misinterpreted the evidence, writ-
ing that the "hair evidence placed [petitioner] at the decedent's apart-
ment.' '26 The district court decision was subsequently reversed on this 
ground.27 Nonetheless, the defendant was later exonerated by exculpatory 
17 B. Scheck, P. Neufeld & J. Dwyer, Actual Innocence Imwcence: Five Days to 
Er:ecution and Other Dispatchesji·om the Wrongly Convicted (2000). 
18 Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995), aff'd, 
110 F.3d 1508 (lOth Cir. 1997), rev'd on this ground, 110 F.3d 1508, 1523 (lOth 
Cir. 1997). 
19 ld. at 1554. 
20 Id. (emphasis added). 
21 Id. 
22 ld. at 1558. 
23 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S. Ct. 
2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 37 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1 (1993) (" [U]nder the Rules the 
trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is 
not only relevant, but reliable.''). 
24 Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1558. 
25 ld.at1557. 
26 ld. 
27 Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1523 (1Oth Cir. 1997) (due process, not 
Daubert, standard applies in habeas proceedings). 
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DNA evidence, and as Scheck and his colleagues point out, "The hair evi-
dence was patently unreliable.' ' 28 
Steven Paul Linscott 
As Williamson demonstrates, the misleading nature of hair evidence 
may be attributable to the prosecutor rather than the expert. People v. Lin-
scott29 is illustrative. In this case, ''the prosecutor argued that hairs found in 
the victim's apartment and on the victim's body were in fact defendant's 
hairs. " 30 Reversing, the Illinois Supreme Court wrote: "With these state-
ments, the prosecutor improperiy argued that the hairs removed from the 
victim's apartment were conclusively identified as coming from defendant's 
head and pubic region. There simply was no testimony at trial to support 
these statements. In fact, [the prosecution experts] and the defense hair expert 
. . . testified that no such identification was possible.' ' 31 DNA testing 
exculpated Linscott. 32 
Other Innocents 
Several other convicts later exonerated by DNA also had to confront 
hair evidence at their trials: David Vasquez33 and Dennis Williams.34 One of 
the most infamous cases involved the prosecution of Glen Woodall.35 The 
expert in the Woodall case was Trooper Fred Zain, chief serologist in West 
28 Scheck, Neufeld & Dwyer, supra note 17, at 146. See also id. at 134 ("Not 
until December 1985, three years after the murder, did the state finish its first report 
on the hair examination. A trained hair man named Melvin Hett concluded that 
thirteen hairs found around the victim's body appeared to have come from the head 
and pubis of Dennis Fritz [an alleged accomplice]. Another four hairs from the mur-
der scene were linked to Ron Williamson. By itself, though, the hair report was not 
strong enough to prove capital murder.''). 
29 People v. Linscott, 142 Ill. 2d 22, 153 Ill. Dec. 249, 566 N.E.2d 1355 (1991). 
30 Id. at 1358. 
31 Id. at 1359. 
32 See Exonerated by Science, supra note 2, at 65 ("The State's expert on the hair 
examination testified that only 1 in 4,5000 person would have consistent hairs when 
tested for 40 different characteristics. He only tested between 8 and 12 characteristics, 
however, and could not remember which ones. The appellate court mled on July 29, 
1987, that his testimony, coupled with the prosecution's use of it at closing argu-
ments, constituted denial of a fair trial.")( citation omitted). 
33 Id. at 73 (discussing Vasquez case). David Vasquez was also convicted based 
upon a false confession. Indeed, Vasquez, who was borderline retarded, pled guilty. 
His confession was based on a dream, and ''his account was incoherent and incon-
sistent." The police convinced Vasquez that his fingerprints were found at the scene, 
and then they fed him the details of the crime. See P. Mones, Stal/dng Justice: The 
Dramatic True Story of the Detective Who First Used DNA Testing to Catch a Serial 
Killer 54 (1995); Giannelli, "The DNA Story: An Altemative View," 88 J. Crim. 
L. & Criminology 380 (1997). 
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Virginia, who reported the results of phantom lab tests for a decade-all 
favoring the prosecution. Even after he left the state, West Virginia prosecu-
tors sent him evidence to examine because they could no longer get the 
''right'' results from their own crime lab. A judicial inquiry concluded that 
''as a matter of law, any testimonial or documentary evidence offered by 
Zain at any time in any criminal prosecution should be deemed invalid, 
unreliable, and inadmissible."36 The West Virginia Supreme Court opinion 
adopting this judicial investigative report speaks of ''shocking'' and 
"egregious violations," "corruption of our legal system," and "mock[ing] 
the ideal of justice under law.' '37 An accompanying report states: 
The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included (1) overstating the 
strength of results; (2) overstating the frequency of genetic matches on in-
dividual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency of genetic 
matches on multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting that multiple items 
of evidence had been tested, when only a single item had been tested; (5) 
reporting inconclusive results as conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering labora-
tory records; (7) grouping results to create the erroneous impression that 
genetic markers had been obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing to 
report conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to report conducting 
additional testing to resolve conflicting results; (10) implying a match with 
a suspect when testing supported only a match with the victim; and (ll) 
reporting scientifically impossible or improbable results.38 
Misconduct 
Zain was not the only government official who abused his office in using 
hair evidence. In Nelson v. Zanfl9 the critical evidence was a hair found on 
the victim's body. The state's expert testified that the hair not only could 
have come from the defendant but that it could only have come from about 
120 people in the entire Savannah area. The prosecution failed to disclose 
34 See Scheck, Neufeld & Dwyer, supra note 17, at 184 (discussing the Williams 
case)("And then there was the Caucasian hair collected from the backseat of Wil-
liams' car. The state's lab expert said three of the hairs matched the victims' hair. 
[The defense attorney] didn't talk to any other forensic experts. Years later, it would 
be shown that the hair was nothing like the victims'.''). 
35 I d. at 111 (''Then there was the single reddish-brown hair recovered from the 
car. Could the hair have come from anyone but Glen Dale Woodall's beard? 'Highly 
unlikely,' was Zain' s answer."); id. at 113 ("Just three months before the trial, Zain 
had written a report stating that it was a pubic hair-not, as he would testify in court, 
a beard hair from Woodall. The other expert who examined the hair said that it bore 
no similarities to any ofWoodall's hair, from any part of his body."). See also Gi-
annelli, ''The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Inde-
pendent Crime Laboratories," 4 Va. J. Social Policy & L. 439 (1997). 
36 ln reInvestigation of theW. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 
S.E.2d 501,502 (W.Va. 1993). 
37 ld. at 518. 
38 Id. at 516. 
39 Nelson v. Zant, 261 Ga. 358,405 S.E.2d 250 (1991). 
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that the FBI had also examined the hair and concluded that it was not suit-
able for comparison purposes. On review, the prosecution argued that the 
hair evidence was not ''material'' within the meaning of Brady. 40 The Geor-
gia Supreme Court reversed. 
Scheck and his colleagues provide other illustrations, including cases 
where laboratory results were inconsistant and where important information 
was deleted.42 
Court Cases 
In the past courts43 have upheld the admissibility of hair evidence under 
the Frye general acceptance test. 44 Recent cases have followed this trend, 
even under Daubert. In Johnson v. Commonwealth45 the Kentucky Supreme 
Court upheld the admissibility of hair evidence. Because hair comparison 
evidence had been accepted by Kentucky courts and other state courts, the 
supreme court held that trial courts in Kentucky could take judicial notice 
that hair comparison evidence was scientifically reliable. Thus, the proponent 
of hair comparison evidence does not need to prove reliability; the burden 
shifts to the opponent of the evidence to prove umeliability. The court also 
rejected Johnson's argument that there was no proficiency testing for hair 
analysis as there is for DNA analysis, since, unlike DNA analysis, hair anal-
ysis depends on the skill of the person making the comparison. One justice 
dissented, noting that "Appellant's future is, both literally and figuratively, 
hanging by a hair.' ' 46 The dissenting justice correctly believed that the hair 
comparison evidence should have been scrutinized in accordance with Daub-
ert. He noted that the level of acceptance of scientific techniques can change 
over time and judicial notice ''should be reserved for the rare occasion when 
the evidence sought to be admitted is seemingly beyond dispute, such as, for 
example, evidence that the sun rises every day in the east, or acknowledg-
ment of the law of gravity.' ' 47 Similarly, the Hawaii Supreme Court has 
ruled that '' [b ]ecause the scientific principles and procedures underlying hair 
40 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87,83 S. Ct. 1194,10 L. Ed. 2d215 (1963) 
("[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.''). 
42 Id. at 167 (Timothy Durham case) ("There was something else she had never 
seen before: the tips of the pubic hairs had been cut, as if shaved by a razor. This 
was such a remarkable fact that Hair Examiner Cox did not even mention it in her 
written report."). 
43 E.g., U. S. v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 363, 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 492 (6th Cir. 
1979); People v. Watkins, 78 Mich. App. 89, 259 N.W.2d 381, 385 (1977). 
44 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923). See 1 Giannelli & Imwinkelried, supra note 1, ch. 1 
(discussing the Frye test). 
45 Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258 (Ky. 1999) 
46 Id. at 267. 
47 Id. 
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and fiber evidence are well-established and of proven reliability, the evi-
dence in the present case can be treated as 'technicallmowledge.' Thus, an 
independent reliability determination was mmecessary.' '48 
Challenging Hair Evidence 
Despite these cases, hair evidence-if overstated-is vulnerable to at-
tack. Significantly, the attack on hair evidence in Williamson ultimately 
failed not because the evidence satisfied Daubert but because Daubert was 
not the appropriate standard of review of state evidentiary findings in federal 
habeas proceedings. The attack on admissibility should be continued even 
though courts have upheld the admissibility of hair evidence. 
Subjectivity 
First, as noted above, opinion testimony conceming the comparison of 
hairs is subjective. 49 One study focused on this subjectivity and examiner 
bias: "The findings of the present study raise some concem regarding the 
amount of unintentional bias among human hair identification examiners. 
. . . A preconceived conclusion that a questioned hair sample and a known 
hair sample originate from the same individual may influence the examiner's 
opinion when the samples are similar.' ' 50 
Positive Identifications 
Second, the expert should not make a "positive" identification-i.e., 
that two hairs match to the exclusion of all other persons. If an expert insists 
48 State v. Fukusaku, 85 Haw. 462, 946 P.2d 32, 44 (Haw. 1997). See also 
McGrew v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (Ind. 1997) (hair comparison admissible, 
more a matter of observation by persons with specialized lmowledge than a matter 
of scientific principles); McCarty v. State, 1995 OK CR 48,904 P.2d 110, 125 (Olda. 
Crim. App. 1995) (admitting hair evidence). 
49 Miller, "Procedural Bias in Forensic Science Examinations of Human Hair," 
11 Law & Hum. Behav. 157, 157-58 (1987)("Hair cannot be 'individualized' as 
with fingerprints. Human hair characteristics (e.g., scale patterns, pigmentation, 
size, etc.) vary within a single individual. ... Although the examination procedure 
involves objective methods of analysis, the subjective weights associated with the 
characteristics rest with the examiner."). 
50 I d. at 161. This study reports that the usual method of human hair analysis is 
less accurate than an alternative line-up procedure, due to outside sources of influ-
ence on the examiner. In the conventional method the examiner is given hair samples 
from a lmown suspect along with a report including other facts and information re-
lating to the guilt of the suspect. The line-up method gives the examiner hair samples 
from the suspect along with hair samples with similar characteristics from other 
individuals. The examiner is in no way informed which samples come from the 
suspect or even if there is a particular suspect. In short, using the line-up method 
may reduce the impact of preconceived opinions and result in less false positives. 
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on making a positive identification, the expert should be asked the basis of· 
this opinion. What scientific text supports this? If it is only based on personal 
experience, the expert should be asked how many hair examinations the 
expert has conducted. Suppose the expert replies: "500 examinations." 
Often, the 500 examinations did not involve comparing each hair against the 
other 499. Rather, the expert examined three hairs in one case and six in an-
other; the three hairs in the first case were never compared with six hairs in 
the second case. 
"Consistent With" Testimony 
Third, if the expert testifies that the accused's exemplars are ''consistent 
with'' the crime scene hairs, the expert should concede on cross-examination 
that the hair could have come from a person other than the accused. Once the 
expert makes this concession, the cross-examiner could take the expert ''up 
the ladder": The crime scene hair could have come from 5 other persons, 10, 
50, 100, 500, 1,000, 100,000 and so forth-until the expert balks. But why 
does the expert balk? What scientific text supports a lower number?51 
Proficiency Testing 
Fourth, as Scheck and his colleagues note, ''In the early 1970s, the U.S. 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) sponsored a profi-
ciency testing program for 240 laboratories that provided evidence in crimi-
nal cases. The labs botched many kinds of tests: paint, glass, rubber, fibers. 
But by far, the worst results came from hair analysis.' '52 The study cited was 
a 1978 Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program sponsored by the LEAA.53 
Over 200 crime laboratories pmiicipated in this program, which involved 
such common forensic examinations as firearms, blood, drug, and trace evi-
dence analyses. Seventy one percent of the crime laboratories tested provided 
unacceptable results in a blood test, 51.4 percent made errors in matching 
paint samples, 35.5 percent erred in a soil examination, and 28.2 percent 
made mistakes in firearms identifications. The Report concluded: "A wide 
range of proficiency levels among the nation's laboratories exists, with sev-
eral evidence types posing serious difficulties for the laboratories. . . . '' 54 As 
51 See Thorton, "The General Assumptions and Rationale of Forensic Identifica-
tion, in 2 Modern Scientific Evidence§ 20-9.2.3, at 28 (Faigman et al. 1997) ("In an 
inclusionary mode, . . . hair is a miserable form of evidence. The most that can be 
said about a hair is that it is consistent with having originated from a particular 
person, but that it would also be consistent with the hair of numerous other people. 
Stronger opinions are occasionally expressed, but they would not be supportable.''). 
52 Scheck, Neufeld & Dwyer, supra note 17, at 162. 
53 J. Peterson, E. Fabricant & K. Field, Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing 
Research Program 188-89 (L.E.A.A. Oct. 1978). 
54 Id.at3. 
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for the five hair tests, 55 the unacceptable rates were: (A) 50.0 percent, 56 (B) 
27.8 percent, 57 (C) 54.4 percent, 58 (D) 67.8 percent,59 and (E) 35.6 percent. 60 
A later study showed similar results. 61 Between 1980 and 1991, crime 
laboratories were given eight hair proficiency tests in which the exercises 
ranged from identifying species of anima] hairs to identifying the area of the 
human body from which a hair originated. In two separate tests, an average 
of 44 percent and 30 percent of the laboratories correctly identified the spe-
cies of anima1.62 When trying to determine the location of human hair, an 
average of 56 percent of the laboratories were correct, with greater success 
identifying hair as coming from the pubic and head region than identifying 
hair from the beard, arm, and chest regions. 63 The authors of the study 
concluded: "Animal and human (body area) hair identifications are dearly 
55 The tests consisted of five sample items: (A) dog hair, (B) cat hair, (C) deer 
hair, (D) cow hair, and (E) mink hair. 
56 I d. at 232. Of the 90 laboratOiies tested, 19 identified the dog hair as coming 
from some animal other than a dog, 17 identified the hair only as ''non-human,'' 8 
reported inconclusive results, and 3 reported no results. Forty-three laboratories cor-
rectly identified the hair. 
57 I d. at 232. Of the 90 laboratories tested, 13 identified the cat hair only as ''non-
human," 6 identified the hair as coming from some animal other than a cat, 3 
reported no results, and 2 reported inconclusive results. Sixty-six laboratories cor-
rectly identified the hair. 
58 I d. at 232. Of the 90 laboratories tested, 3 I identified the deer hair as coming 
from some animal other than a deer, 10 identified the hair only as "non-human," 4 
reported inconclusive results, and 4 reported no results. Forty-one laboratories cor-
rectly identified the hair. 
59 I d. at 252. Of the 90 laboratories tested, 36 identified the cow hair as coming 
from some animal other than a cow, 12 identified the hair only as "non-human," 7 
reported inconclusive results, and 4 reported no results. Thirty-one laboratories cor-
rectly identified the hair. 
60 Id. at 232-33. Of the 90 laboratories tested, 17 identified the minlc hair as com-
ing from some animal other than a mink, 12 identified the hair only as ''non-
human,'' 4 reported no results. Fifty-seven laboratories correctly identified the hair. 
61 Peterson & Markham, ''Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Results, I 978-
1991, I: Identification and Classification of Physical Evidence, 40 J. Forensic Sci. 
994, 1007 (1995) ("In sum, laboratories were no more successful in identifying the 
correct species of origin of animal hair . . . than they were in the earlier LEAA 
study."). 
62 I d. at I 004-05. In the first test, 76 percent of the laboratories tested correctly 
identified deer hair, 28 percent correctly identified opossum hair, and 28 percent cor-
rectly identified bear hair. In the second test, 45 percent correctly identified squirrel 
hair, 36 percent correctly identified moose hair, and 9 percent correctly identified 
fox hair. 
63 Id. at 1004-05. Ninety-six percent of the laboratories tested correctly identified 
human wig head hair, 87 percent conectly identified human head hair, 84 percent 
correctly identified human pubic hair, 40 percent coiTectly identified human arm 
hair, 33 percent coiTectly identified human beard hair, 25 percent correctly identified 
human beard/facial hair, and 25 percent correctly identified human chest/body hair. 
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the most troublesome of all categories tested.' '64 In another series of hair 
tests, the examiners had to "include" or "exclude" in comparing known 
and unknown samples: "Laboratories reported inclusions and exclusions 
which agreed with the manufacturer in approximately 74 percent of their 
comparisons. About 18 percent of the responses were inconclusive, and 8 
percent in disagreement with the manufacturers' information."65 
Statistical Evidence 
Not content with "consistent with" testimony, some experts have used 
statistical probability evidence in presenting their conclusions. For example, 
in United States v. Massey66 the expert testified that three of five hairs found 
in a blue ski mask similar to one worn by one of the robbers were microscopi-
cally similar to the defendant's hair. He also cited a study for the proposition 
that there was a one in 4,500 or one in 2,000 chance of his identification be-
ing wrong. The prosecutor emphasized these numbers in closing argument, 
telling the jury that the ''hair sample would be proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt because it is so convincing.' ' 67 The Eighth Circuit correctly found 
plain error. Similarly, in State v. Carlson68 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
ruled probability hair evidence inadmissible. 
The issue also arose in United States ex rel. DiGiacomo v. Franzen, 69 
where the "one in 4,500" probability was again used. During its delibera-
tions, the jury submitted the following question to the judge: ''Has it been 
established by sampling of hair specimens that the defendant was positively 
proven to have been in the automobile?" 70 Surprisingly, the conviction was 
upheld on a nanow ground-i.e., in habeas proceedings the misuse of evi-
dence violates due process only in extreme cases. 71 Unfortunately, the 
64 Id. at 1007. 
65 Peterson & Markham, "Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Results, 1978-
1991, II: Resolving Questions of Common Origin, 40 J. Forensic Sci. 1009, 1023 
(1995). See also id. at 1022 ("Examiners warned that "they needed to employ par-
ticular caution in interpreting the hair results given the virtual impossibility of 
achieving complete sample homogeneity.'') 
66 U.S. v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1979). 
67 Id. at 681. 
68 State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170 (Millil. 1978). 
69 U.S. ex rei. DiGiacomo v. Franzen, 680 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1982). 
70 Id. at 516. 
71 I d. at 519 (''The Constitution does not and, indeed, cannot guarantee that only 
completely reliable evidence will be placed before the jury. Although it does demand 
that a defendant be given a full and fair opportunity to challenge whatever evidence 
is admitted, DiGiacomo was afforded that opportunity here. Through his counsel, he 
was free to challenge Dillon's testimony if it was not true, or clarify it if it was 
misleading. He was also free to call his own expert if he thought Dillon's testimony 
was at odds with the established views of the scientific community. DiGiacomo in 
fact did none of these things. No attempt was made to cross-examine Dillon regard- · 
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Seventh Circuit did not appreciate that it was confronting that "extreme" 
case. 
Although the "one in 4,500" was derived from published studies, 72 
these estimates, as one commentator notes, "are easily challenged. " 73 Two 
other corrimentators reviewed the research in this field. 74 Almost all empiri-
cal evidence conceming human hair comparison is based on the experiments 
of one man (Gaudette).75 Before courts admit figures of statistical probability 
based on Gaudette's findings, critical examination is required. One major 
flaw in his study was the lack of "blindedness"; he knew that each match 
was a false positive. This flaw is compounded by the fact that hair analysis is 
subjective since every hair, even hair from the same individual, is variable. 
Hair examiners are simply looking for unaccountable differences, but there 
are no objective guidelines to follow. Another problem is that some people 
have ''featureless hair"-their hair has very few unique characteristics. Gau-
dette's study does not estimate the frequency of' 'feahireless hair,'' nor does 
he account for the impact that this might have on his numbers. 
Furthermore, important differences between Gaudette's controlled test-
ing and the forensic setting exist. Gaudette did not account for pre-
comparison exclusions that would be common in a criminal investigation. If 
a suspect is known to be Caucasian, the police are not going to present the 
hair examiner with samples from an African American individual. Gaud-
ette's comparison of hair samples with such obvious differences will inflate 
the statistical results in favor of true positives. Another important difference 
between Gaudette's study and forensics is the expe1iise and reliability of the 
examiners. Gaudette was probably more careful than the average technician, 
and as already stated, hair analysis is very subjective. Finally, there is the is-
sue of outside influence and preconceived bias. When a hair analysis expert 
gets a sample in the forensics world, it is usually because that individual is 
ing her testimony that hairs found in Marik's car belonged to the defendant.")(cita-
tion omitted). 
72 See Gaudette & Keeping, "An Attempt at Determining Probabilities in Human 
Scalp Hair Comparison," I 9 J. Forensic Sci. 599 (1974); Gaudette, "Probabilities 
and Human Pubic Hair Comparison," 21 J. Forensic Sci. 514 (1976). 
73 D. Kaye, Science in Evidence 28 (1997). See also A. Moenssens, J. Starrs, C. 
Henderson & F. Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Civil alnd Criminal Cases 578 (4th ed. 
1995) ("The problem with using these statistics is that, while they appear to tell the 
jury that the likelihood is great that we are dealing with a near positive match be-
tween the crime scene hair and the hairs known to have come from the defendant, 
that is not at all what they mean.''). 
74 Smith & Goodman, "Forensic Hair Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century 
Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?," 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 227,231 
(1996) "If the purveyors of this dubious science cannot do a better job of validating 
hair analysis than they have done so far, forensic hair comparison analysis should 
excluded altogether from criminal trials.''). 
75 Although human hair analysis has generally been accepted into American 
courts as a reliable science, since the only practical use of hair analysis is in the 
criminal setting its exposure to scientific evaluation is very limited. 
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already a suspect. Any outside influence is likely to taint the examiner's 
belief as to the validity of the match. Although Gaudette made a worthwhile 
effort to support the use of hair analysis in criminal investigations, the 
opinion of more than one person should be required before such evidence 
may be introduced in court.76 
Basis Of Testimony 
One of the more remarkable hair cases ended up in the United States 
Supreme Court. In Delaware v. Fensterer77 the Supreme Court considered a 
confrontation challenge involving the basis of expert testimony. In that case 
an FBI analyst testified that hair found at a murder scene had been forcibly 
removed. He further testified that three methods were available to make this 
determination, but he could not remember which method he had used to 
reach his conclusion. According to the Delaware Supreme Court, the expert's 
lack of memory precluded the defense from testing the basis for the opinion 
by cross-examination and thus violated the right of confrontation.78 
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. In the Court's view, 
"[T]he Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given 
a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose . . . infirmities through cross-
examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for 
giving scant weight to the witness' testimony. " 79 The Court went on to hold 
that such an opportunity had been provided at tlial, noting that the ''defense 
counsel's cross-examination of Agent Robillard demonstrated to the jury 
that Robillard could not even recall the theory on which his opinion was 
based.' ' 80 The Court, however, did caution that its decision was limited to 
the facts presented. 81 Nevertheless, on remand the Delaware Supreme Court 
again held the opinion inadmissible, but on evidentiary, rather than 
constitutional, grounds. According to the comi: "While a witness's mere 
lack of memory as to a particular fact may go only to the weight of that evi-
dence, an expert witness's inability to establish a sufficient basis for his 
76 Smith & Goodman, supra note 72, at 257 ("Despite the paucity of empirical 
study upon which a hair expert may rely when testifying about the probability of 
matching hairs, experts have nonetheless testified in a number of cases to specific 
probabilities of match hairs based on statistical studies of mysterious origin.''). 
77 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S. Ct. 292, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15, 18 Fed. R. 
Evid. Serv. 945 (1985). 
78 Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 959, 964 (Del. 1985), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S. Ct. 292, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15, 18 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 945 
( 1985). 
79 474 U.S. at 22. 
80 Id. at 20. 
81 Id. ("We need not decide whether there are circumstances in which a witness' 
lapse of memory may so frustrate any opportunity for cross-examination that admis-
sion of the witness' direct testimony violates the Confrontation Clause.''). 
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opinion clearly renders the opinion inadmissible under D.R.E. 705."82 No 
matter what the U.S. Supreme Court may say about the Constitution, expert 
testimony based on a "forgotten" methodology is worthless as a matter of 
science and evidence law. 
DNA Testing 
The advent of DNA evidence alters the use of hair evidence. If the root 
of a hair is recovered, it may be analyzed by several DNA methods: RFLP, 
PCR, STRs.83 In addition, mitochondrial DNA has been used for this pur-
pose.84 State v. Counci/ 85 was the first reported case. 
Conclusion 
As noted earlier, hair evidence may be invaluable in some cases. Never-
theless, it is also one ofthe most abused types of scientific evidence. It should 
be challenged as a matter of routine. 
82 Fensterer v. State, 509 A.2d 1106, 1109-10 (Del. 1986). 
83 See Linch, Smith & Prahlow, "Evau1ation of the Human Hair Root for DNA 
Typing Subsequent to Microscopic Comparison," 43 J. Forensic Sci. 305 (1998); 2 
Giannelli & Imwinkelried, supra note 1, ch. 18. 
84 See Allen et al., ''Mitochond1ial DNA Sequencing of Shed Hairs and Saliva on 
Robbery Caps: Sensitivity and Matching Probabilities, 43 J. Forensic Sci. 453 
(1998). See also Savolainen & Lundeberg, ''Forensic Evidence Based on DNA 
from Dog and WolfHairs," 44 J. Forensic Sci. 77 (1999). 
85 State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 
1050, 120 S. Ct. 588, 145 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1999). See Curriden, "A New Evidence 
Tool: First Use of Mitochondrial DNA Test in a U.S. Criminal Trial," 82 A.B.A. J. 
18, 18 (Nov. 1996) (therape-murderofa 4-year-old girl was solved from a small red 
hair found in the victim's throat). Previously, RFLP and PCR has been used, both of 
which test for DNA in the cell nucleus. MitochondJial DNA is found outside the cell 
nucleus and is inherited from the mother. 
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